

## Amendments to the Specification are as follows:

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 2, line 1 and ending on page 2, line 15 as follows:

Hitherto, as the remote keyless entry (RKE) for locking or unlocking the door locking mechanism of a vehicle, there are known a manual RKE that is in one-way communication from a portable unit to an in-vehicle unit as well as a passive ~~RKE~~PKE that is in two-way communication between a portable unit and an in-vehicle unit. This passive ~~RKE~~PKE is to lock or unlock the door of a vehicle automatically and perform ~~do the~~ two-way communication between a portable unit a user carries and an in-vehicle unit set in the vehicle, ~~and~~ As a result of the recognition of the portable unit ID and the in-vehicle ID, when the in-vehicle unit authenticates the portable unit, it performs the locking or unlocking operation on the door locking mechanism 5. Each of the portable unit and the in-vehicle unit has ~~at the~~ unique ID (Identification Code) and cipher key (Key) in order to authenticate with each other, and at a communication time, they communicate with each other through a signal obtained by encrypting the data including the ID with the cipher key.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 2, line 19 and ending on page 3, line 3 as follows:

In description of the concrete function of the passive ~~RKE~~PKE, the in-vehicle unit 2 transmits a request signal at regular intervals. The request signal, including the in-vehicle ID, can be received ~~arrive~~ at only a short distance. When the portable unit 20 is out of the reach of a request signal, it cannot receive the request signal. While, when a person carrying the portable unit approaches the vehicle, coming into the reach of a request signal, the portable unit receives the request signal, checks the in-vehicle ID included in the request signal, and sends a response signal to the vehicle after confirming that it has been issued from the correct in-vehicle unit.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 3, line 17 and ending on page 3, line 20 as follows:

A request signal and a response signal are encrypted with the cipher key stored by the portable unit and the in-vehicle unit in common and issued, and a receiving party decodes the signal with the cipher key stored in the receiving party by its own self.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 3, line 21 and ending on page 4, line 8 as follows:

Since the security data such as the ID and the cipher key should be kept in a memory even if a battery is removed, it is stored in a nonvolatile memory such as an EEPROM or a ROM. The data stored into the ~~EEPROM~~ or the ROM indicates the information value in the form of the original data. Especially, in the in-vehicle unit, it is stored in the EEPROM not in the ROM, because of the peculiar situation of the portable unit ID, ~~as follows. This~~ The peculiar situation is that means that the portable unit ID is not initially stored in the in-vehicle, but that the in-vehicle unit, receiving a response signal from some portable unit (one vehicle includes a plurality of portable units having various IDs), analyzes the signal, takes out the portable unit ID previously stored in the same portable unit, and stores it into the self nonvolatile memory of the in-vehicle unit.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 4, line 21 and ending on page 5, line 9 as follows:

In the above-mentioned conventional technique, while use of a ~~since the ROM as a nonvolatile memory adopts the structure of preventing~~ others from decoding the stored contents of the ROM easily, it takes a lot of time and trouble to decode the information above even if others try to do. On the contrary, generally, ~~the EEPROM~~ it is comparatively easy to analyze the stored contents of the EEPROM, ~~if according to the specification of the IC because of its structure.~~ Accordingly, when the data of the portable ID and the cipher key stored in the EEPROM is decoded by others and its rule is analyzed by others, the security of many cars having similar cipher keys may

~~be compromised there is a fear of causing the collapse of the securities of many cars.~~ Using ~~In the~~ conventional techniques, there has been a problem from the viewpoint of the security of a car because the security data such as the ID and the cipher key is stored in the EEPROM as it is with no change of value.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 9, line 17 and ending on page 10, line 2 as follows:

In use of the remote keyless entry (RKE), the portable unit ID included in a response signal is newly registered in the in-vehicle unit, by setting the in-vehicle unit at the ID register mode, to analyze a response signal issued by the portable unit 20, take out the corresponding portable unit ID, and store it in the EEPROM 9. In short, a prescribed portable unit ID is not previously stored in the in-vehicle unit 2, but the portable ID of a portable unit is learned and stored. Thus, ~~it is necessary to store a~~ portable unit ID is stored before use of the RKE, rather than ~~not~~ simultaneously with completion of the manufacture of an in-vehicle unit. Therefore, the portable unit ID is stored in a nonvolatile memory, not in ~~the~~ ROM but in the EEPROM.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 10, line 10 and ending on page 10, line 23 as follows:

The ID (portable unit ID and in-vehicle unit ID) stored in the EEPROM 9 is a signal encrypted with a second cipher key by the data encryption controller 10, ~~and this is one of the characteristic points of the invention.~~ If ID is stored in the EEPROM directly in the form of its original signal as done like the conventional technique, ~~there is such a fear that~~ the ID may be decoded by others because of the structure of the EEPROM, which is a serious problem from the viewpoint of security of the vehicle. According to the invention, since ID is encrypted with the second cipher key and stored in the EEPROM 9, the ID cannot be decoded even if the data is read out by others. Together with the first cipher key for a request signal and a response signal, the second cipher key is also stored in the ROM 8 whose data is difficult to decode.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 12, line 4 and ending on page 12, line 15 as follows:

Although the above description has been made, by way of example, by using the passive RKE for issuing a request signal at regular intervals, a trigger switch may be provided in a door handle, and the operation of the trigger switch may cause the transmission of a request signal. Further, although the description has been made, by way of example, in the case where the in-vehicle system is the door locking mechanism, the in-vehicle system is not restricted to this, but it may be some~~the~~ other device such as an engine starter. In the case of the engine starter, the trigger switch may be built in the ignition cylinder for inserting a mechanical key or it may be built as an individual~~a single~~ switch.

Please amend the paragraph beginning on page 12, line 23 and ending on page 13, line 2 as follows:

Further, also in the communication through a request signal and a response signal in the remote keyless entry, the security is assured by encrypting through~~the~~ two-way communication with the other cipher key, and since the other cipher key is stored in a nonvolatile memory such as a ROM whose data is difficult to decode, there is no fear that the other cipher key may be decoded by others.